尹德敏
韓國外國語大學講座教授
北韓為什麼要發展洲際彈道飛彈？
也才不過幾年前而已，我們都太過沈溺於北韓這個失敗的國家終究難逃崩潰的命運，接下來就能由我們主導南、北韓統一的樂觀氣氛中。然而，這個失敗國家發展核武的成果，現在已經逐漸成為明擺在眼前的事實了。
北韓這個社會主義國家現在傳至第三代領導人手上，這位年輕領導人對於權力的渴望不但導致將近兩百名政府高階官員因此遭到殺害，甚至就連領導人自己的親哥哥也都無法倖免。金正恩過分地沉溺仿效祖父金日成的風範，甚至不惜重啟赤化南韓的侵略性作法。
實在很難想像一個亞洲最貧困、最倒行逆施的國家，居然就在一個狂人的獨裁統治下，踏上了發展長程飛彈的路程。現在，金正恩已經玩得太過火了——北韓光是在2016年就發射了24次彈道飛彈，另外還進行了兩次核子試爆，2017年甫過半未久，北韓又再追加試射了18枚飛彈，其中包括兩枚洲際彈道飛彈的初步原型。北韓在去年七月成功試射火星14號（Hwasong-14）飛彈的時候，其實就已經預告了他們已經快要具備以洲際彈道飛彈攻擊美國本土的能力了。
南韓全境都已經處在上千顆各式彈道飛彈的攻擊範圍內，這還沒算上其他搭載在潛艦、飛彈拖車和移動軌道等發射平台的飛彈，這些都對南韓的防衛能力帶來嚴重的挑戰。
北韓的飛彈已經發展到了此一地步，這段期間我們有做出什麼樣的回應嗎？南韓一直以來都低估了北韓的軍事力量，把改善兩韓關係當成了施政重點，就連北韓第一次進行核子試爆的時候，當時的南韓總統甚至還指出這是北韓為了對抗美國威脅所採取的自衛措施。過去我們一直認為北韓是為了求生存才發展核子武器，因此營造出讓北韓政權得以維繫，會是解決這個議題關鍵所在的氣氛。如果維繫政權是北韓的目標，則北韓只需要具備最基本的威嚇能力也就已經夠了，但是北韓最新的動作卻顯示他們所期待的並不僅止於此。發展洲際彈道飛彈是北韓向美國施壓放棄防衛南韓的手段，一旦北韓取得攻擊美國本土的能力，華府就必須思考是否要冒著讓舊金山和洛杉磯陷入戰火的風險去防衛南韓，連帶使得其他遏阻北韓的作法都顯得投鼠忌器，導致南韓和美國的共同防禦有可能在北韓洲際彈道飛彈的影響下而被迫拆夥。北韓能夠威脅美國的飛彈技術無疑是南韓的夢魘，是扭轉局勢的一步棋，考驗著過去六十五年以來建立在南韓與美國共同防禦機制下的朝鮮半島安全態勢。即便日後各方走上了談判桌，恐怕也必須以承認北韓是個核武國家為條件，才有可能換取他們放棄洲際彈道飛彈的技術。北韓也會要求和美國簽署雙邊和平協議，如此一來，北韓將是朝鮮半島上唯一能夠擁核自重的國家了。
如何遏止北韓的核武野心
去年七月，當我看到北韓成功完成洲際彈道飛彈的試射後，我就開始擔心國際社會過去花了四分之一世紀阻礙北韓發展核子武器的努力，到頭來恐怕只會淪為一場空了。這場試射能夠按部就班成功執行，其實已經意味著我們不再有機會阻止北韓能夠有效部署核子武器了。
觀諸聯合國過去二十多年的記錄，安理會第2371號決議文無疑會對北韓帶來更嚴格、更有效的制裁措施，這都是因為我們現在已經感受到北韓核武問題的迫切危機，以及體認到加強國際社會的合作確有其必要的緣故。積極的國際合作將會是能否遏止北韓成為核武國家的關鍵。
唯有國際制裁的力道強到足以撼動北韓政權的穩固，否則放棄發展核武就不可能會是北韓的選項。事實上，我們都很清楚落實制裁並不是件簡單的工作，我們的目標當然也不是為了制裁而制裁，而是為了解除北韓的核子武裝，制裁只是希望能達成解除北韓核子武裝的手段而已。
不難想像在可見的將來還是會有與北韓進行協商對話的可能，但是國際制裁的措施卻必須維持一貫才行。解決北韓核武問題的關鍵就在於有沒有可能維持強而有力的國際制裁措施，直到順利解除北韓的核子武裝為止。
我們必須向北韓傳遞清楚明確的訊息，讓北韓知道只要繼續發展核武，就要準備好承受有可能威脅到政權穩固的戰略代價。這一點毫無疑問是和北韓展開對話前最重要的先決條件。
如何建立有效的威嚇
唯一能讓我們感到慶幸的是金正恩有著虛張聲勢的習慣，但是我們卻不能肯定「金正恩只是紙老虎」這樣的期待還能維持多長的時間。
我們當下最要緊的工作就是取得對北韓有效的嚇阻力。在面對北韓核武威脅之際，壓倒性的嚇阻力才是唯一能夠防衛南韓的方式，而不是透過外交手腕。唯有建立強大又可靠的嚇阻力，我們才有辦法爭取時間，在中、長期解決北韓發展核武的問題。如果沒有可靠的嚇阻力，則所有對北韓的政策都將面臨失敗一途。發展強大又可靠的嚇阻力既是以和平方式解決北韓核武問題的起始點，也是這個過程的基礎條件。
唯有相互毀滅的報復性手段才能嚇阻核戰的爆發，這一點可以說是老生常談。準此，為了回應北韓洲際彈道飛彈技術的發展，我們必須強化美國核武保護傘的可靠度，確保北韓一旦採取任何率先動用核武的挑釁行為都一定會立即遭受美國核武的報復。有些人認為南韓必須重啟戰略性核武做為因應，但是落實這個方案的可行性不無疑問，以當前的政治情勢來看，光是要順順利利部署防禦性的薩德系統（THAAD）就已經不得了。
蘇聯在八○年代進行新一輪的核子飛彈部署，引起北約盟國間是否要繼續仰賴美國提供核武保護傘的激烈辯論。北約國家隨後以部署美國潘興二型（Pershing II）飛彈和巡弋飛彈的方式做為回應，更加強化了核武保護傘的承諾。相較之下，美國至今仍舊沒有在韓半島或鄰近的海域部署核子武器；為了保衛南韓，勢必要從美國本土動用戰略性的核子武器，也一定要在東海部署攜帶核子彈頭的潛艦才能達到核武的嚇阻效果。另外，應該對同樣面臨北韓核武威脅的日本展開合作，讓美、韓、日三國共同管控攜帶核武的潛艦，以達到強化核武保護傘可靠度之目的。
持平而論，有些南韓人認為應該要自主發展核武才能有效對抗北韓所帶來的威脅，有些人則強調從美國引進戰略核武的必要性，但是南韓不但在檯面上是個非核武國家，也一直恪遵兩韓在1992年所簽署的《朝鮮半島無核化共同宣言》（Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula），這顯示無核化才是南韓追求的目標，而不是透過核武所營造的恐怖平衡。因此南韓需要建立的是「非核武的嚇阻力」，不要成為周遭鄰近國家的安全威脅。
政權更迭的十字路口
除了強力的國際合作體系和建立有效的嚇阻之外，其實還有另一個解決北韓核武問題的根本因素，那就是從根本上改變北韓政權的體質，使之不再執著於將一切都訴諸核武；換句話說，我們應著手推動北韓的政體轉型。
根據衛星在夜晚拍攝的畫面顯示，在北韓這種連點亮燈泡的電力都嚴重匱乏的國度裡，主政者居然能投注大量的經費發展核子武器和彈道飛彈。
北韓是世界上唯一一個公然在檯面上宣稱自己擁有核武、視之為基本國策明載於憲法條文中的國家，問題在於核武不會是北韓政權穩固與否的保障。根據我個人的觀察，我認為北韓目前正處於一個政體轉型的十字路口上。
雖然對北韓的未來樂觀以對是相當不智的作法，但是過度強調北韓政權穩若泰山的態度也一樣不可取。金正恩高壓統治的方式造成噤若寒蟬與互相爭寵的效果，似乎顯示他的統御手腕相當有一套，不過只要恐怖統治的時間拉得越久，金正恩與其他權力菁英之間就越難產生「命運共同體」的感受。不單如此，隨著中國經濟成長趨緩，原物料的價格持續下探，再加上聯合國安理會決議文所強加的全面制裁，這些都可望對北韓的經濟局勢帶來嚴重的打擊。
330萬年輕的北韓人屬於「地下經濟」（Jangmadang）的世代，22萬北韓勞工遠赴海外謀生，四百萬北韓人擁有行動電話，另外還有四百個市場扮演著提供與散播訊息的角色，在在都是北韓社會意識形態鬆綁與一切向錢看的發展跡象。也就是說，相對於當年北韓的封閉體系，現在的領導人想要控制國內的民眾只會難上加難。
在計畫經濟根本行不通的情況下，必須接受私有經濟的存在，而私有經濟的擴張又會加速弱化中央集權的計畫經濟，讓國家機器喪失全面掌握經濟與社會的能力。
總括來說，北韓內部不論是政治、經濟或是社會局勢都存在著相當的矛盾，最起碼在經濟領域已經踏上去中央集權化的不歸路了。北韓的領導人將越來越逼近政體轉型的轉捩點，而這將是他越來越無可迴避的現實問題。
翻譯：陳以禮 台灣安保協會秘書長
North Korea at a crossroads:
Nuclear Armament or Regime Transformation
Yun Duk-Min
Chair Professor
Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
Why North Korea develop ICBM?
Just a few years ago, we were trapped by optimism that North Korea is a failed state which is destined to collapse, and that we will be able to lead unification in our way. But that failed state’s nuclear armament is now becoming a reality.
The socialist regime with three-generation lineage of leadership has killed around 200 high-rank officials and even the leader’s older brother, all because of the young leader’s anxiety over power. Kim Jung-Eun is overly obsessed with emulation of his late grandfather Kim Il-Sung and even resurrected the policy aimed to communize South Korea.
It seems impossible to imagine the most impoverished, backward state in Asia, run by a mad man, should set out to build a long range missile. Kim’s ‘playing with fire’ has gone too far. The regime has carried out 24 ballistic missile tests and 2 nuclear tests in 2016 alone, and fired 18 missiles already to date this year including two prototype ICBMs. North Korea’s successful launch of the Hwasong-14 last July was the moment that suggested the country is about to have the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability to attack the U.S. mainland.
All parts of South Korean territory are already within the striking distance of around 1000 various ballistic missiles. Moreover, submarine launched ballistic missiles, missiles on transporter-erector-launchers, and orbital mobile launcher platforms are challenging the defense capability of South Korea.
Until the North developed the missile, what have we done? South Korea often underestimates the North’s capability and put priority on inter-Korean relations. When the North conducted its first nuclear test, the South Korean president at the time even said it was a self-defense measure against U.S. hostility. We believed that the North was developing nuclear weapons for its survival and that creating an environment for the North’s survival was important to resolve the issue. If survival of the regime was the goal, the North only needed minimum deterrence, but its latest moves show it is going far beyond the goal. The North’s ICBM development is a mechanism that induces the United States to give up defending the South. The moment the North has the ability to attack the U.S. mainland, Washington has to confront the risk of giving up San Francisco and Los Angeles to help South Korea. The reliability of the extended deterrence is put in doubt. Because of the North’s ICBM, the South and the U.S. could face decoupling. North Korea’s missile technology threatening the continental U.S. is a nightmare for us. It means a game changer in the joint defense of South Korea and the U.S. that protected our safety for the past 65 years. Even if a negotiation takes place, the North will likely win recognition as a nuclear state in return for giving up the ICBM technology, and they will demand a North-U.S. peace treaty. On the Korean Peninsula, North Korea will likely enjoy a nuclear monopoly.
How to stop Nuclear Ambition
As I watched North Korea conduct its successful ICBM test last July, I was worried that the international society’s efforts to block North Korea’s nuclear development, which have been under way for the last quarter century, may ultimately result in a failure. The fact that the test was administered successfully implies that we have almost run out of time to prevent North Korea’s nuclear missile units from actually being deployed.
The adoption of the UNSC Resolution 2371 on North Korea, which contains the toughest and most effective sanction measures in past two decades of UN history, was made possible due to our sense of crisis regarding the North Korean nuclear problem, and our recognition of the importance of a strong international cooperation system. Active international cooperation is crucial to preventing North Korea’s nuclear armament.
Only if we establish a sanctions regime that is strong enough to threaten the safety of the North Korean regime will North Korea consider the option of surrendering its nuclear program. We are all well aware of the fact that imposing sanctions is not an easy process. Of course, our goal is not the sanctions themselves, but to denuclearize North Korea. Sanctions are the means through which we can denuclearize North Korea.
Dialogue with North Korea could resume at some point in the future. However, the international sanctions regime should be maintained in consistent form. The key to the solution of the North Korean nuclear problem is whether it will be possible to maintain a strong and effective international sanctions regime until denuclearization is achieved.
We should make it clear that if North Korea continues to hold onto its nuclear weapons, it will have to bear strategic costs to the extent that they can threaten its regime safety. This is, without doubt, the most important precondition for making progress in dialogue with North Korea.
How to Develop a Credible Deterrent
Our only source of comfort is that Kim Jong-un has the habit of making empty threats, but we are still uncertain about how long we should rely on the hope that Kim Jong-un is a crying wolf.
Currently, the most urgent task for us is to obtain credible deterrence against North Korea. In the face of the North’s nuclear threats, overwhelming deterrence, not diplomacy, is the only thing that can protect the South. Only if we succeed in building strong and reliable deterrence capabilities will we become able to solve the North Korean nuclear problem in the mid to long term.
Without credible deterrence, our policy toward North Korea is bound to result in a failure. Developing strong and reliable deterrence capabilities is both the starting point and basis for solving the North Korean nuclear problem through peaceful means.
It is common sense that a nuclear weapon can only be deterred by another nuclear weapon. In response to the North’s ICBM technology, we must strengthen the reliability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. We have to ensure that the U.S. nuclear retaliation is automatic when the North conducts a nuclear provocation. Some argue that South Korea must reintroduce tactical nuclear weapons. But it is questionable if they can really be deployed, because the current political situation doesn’t even allow smooth deployment of a defense system THAAD.
In the 1980s the Soviet Union’s new nuclear missile deployment triggered a serious debate over the reliability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella over NATO allies. NATO countries strengthened the nuclear umbrella by deploying the U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles. As of now, the United States does not have nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and in nearby waters. To protect South Korea, the strategic nuclear weapons of the U.S. mainland should be used. A submarine carrying nuclear weapons must be deployed to the East Sea to use it as a nuclear deterrence. In cooperation with Japan, which faces the same threats, the nuclear submarine needs to be managed jointly among the three countries in order to bolster the reliability of the nuclear umbrella.
To be honest, some South Koreans argue that South Korea should develop its own nuclear weapons in order to ward off threats from North Korea, while some stress the need to bring in tactical nuclear weapons from the U.S. However, South Korea is officially a nuclear-free state, and has been persistently abiding by the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, signed between the two Koreas in 1992.What South Korea wants is denuclearization, rather than a balance of terror generated by nuclear weapons. Thus, South Korea needs to build “non-nuclear deterrence” capabilities will never become a threat to its neighboring countries.
Crossroad of Regime Transformation
Besides the strong international cooperation system and credible deterrence, there is another factor that is essential to solving the North Korean nuclear problem. That is, we should change the nature of the North Korean regime so that it can become less obsessed with nuclear weapons. In other words, we need to bring about regime transformation in North Korea.
As nighttime satellite photography suggests, in a country that even lacks the energy for powering a light bulb the regime has been spending a huge amount of money on developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.
North Korea is the only country in the world that has officially declared itself as a nuclear-armed country in its constitution. Nuclear weapons can never guarantee the safety of the North Korean regime. From my point of view, North Korea currently stands at a crossroad of regime transformation.
While it would be unwise to have wishful thinking regarding the future of North Korea, the tendency to overly emphasize the durability of the North Korean regime is also a problem. Although the fact that Kim Jong-Eun’s reign of terror has generated feeling of tension and induced loyalty competition seems to illustrate the stabilization of his rule, the longer the reign of terror continues, the weaker the sense of “common destiny” between Kim Jong-un and power elite will become. Moreover, the slowdown of China’s economic growth, drop in the price of raw materials, and comprehensive sanctions imposed through the UNSC Resolutions are expected to cause severe damage to the North Korean economy.
3.3 million young North Koreans from the “Jangmadang” generation, 220,000 North Korean laborers who were dispatched overseas, 4 million cell phone users, and 400 general markets have stimulated the dissemination of information, ideological relaxation, and spread of Mormonism among the North Korean society. Thus, the North Korean leader is likely to experience more difficulties in controlling its citizens than he does in is close associates.
The Kim Jong-un regime has been tolerating the private economic sector, in the face of malfunction of the planned economy. Expansion and of the private economy could accelerate the weakening of centrally planned economy, undermining the state’s control over the economy and society.
In conclusion, considerable internal contradictions exist in North Korea’s political system, economy, and society. At least, the irreversible trend of decentralization is progressing in its economy. The North Korean leaders will increasingly come to stand at a cross of regime transformation. It is becoming an unavoidable reality.